In addition to RSF salaries from the wars in Libya and Yemen, and indirect benefit from migration control, the gold mining business is another important source of income for the militia group. Thus, the RSF with its well-equipped troops, not only represents a military danger and a continuing security risk for the Sudanese population, but also an economic one. The revenues of the RSF, more or less well hidden behind private companies, do not benefit the state and the population of the country in any way, but are rather used to further develop the RSF itself and to help its commanders to become even richer.
After the independence of South Sudan in 2011, when oil revenues dropped dramatically, other sources of income had to be found. Soon after, gold was found in the western parts of Sudan, in Darfur. That area that has long been terrorized by the RSF. Today, the country's largest gold company, Al Junaid, is owned by the brother and nephews of the RSF’s top commader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti). Hemedti’s brother, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo, is also RSF deputy commander. The "former militia" leader Hemedti is now not only in the Sovereign Council of the transitional government, but also on the supervisory board of Al Junaid.
The connection of RSF and Hemedti to the country's gold deposits is undeniable. In 2017, the RSF forcibly gained control of the Jebel Amir gold mines in north Darfur, which are some of the largest and most lucrative in the country. At that time, Hemedti's gold company Al Junaid already existed and operated smaller mines in the country. Since Al Junaid has gained controll of Jebel Amir, Hemedti has become one of the richest people in the country.
It is no secret that Hemedti and the RSF make a seemingly endless fortune with the gold. In order to polish up his and the RSF's image, Hemedti pledged more than one billion US dollars to the Central Bank of Sudan after the 2019 revolution and the economic crisis that followed. He himself states that this money comes from the salaries of RSF troops in Libya and Yemen and from the gold mines and other investments of the RSF.
The international non-governmental organization Global Witness reported in December 2019 that according to leaked documents, the company of Hemedti's brother, Al Junaid, owns a bank account in the United Arab Emirates on behalf of the RSF. This clearly proves the financial independence of the RSF. Besides Al Junaid, two small dummy companies also play a role in the business of the RSF: GSK, a small Sudanese technology company, and Tradive General Trading LLC, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. Leaked documents and the archived website of GSK as well as Global Witness' research at the Ministry of Economic Development in Dubai show Hemedti's other brother, Algoney Hamdan Daglo, as owner and CEO of GSK and Tradive.
What was supposed to be a generous and merciful gesture after the revolution to portray Hemedti and his family as successful and generous businessman is, however, exactly the problem: It shows quite clearly that the RSF with its gold mines keeps a parallel economy to the national one, exploiting resources that belong to those communities and the Sudanese people, the majority of whom live in abject poverty. From a strategic point of view, this parallel economy also clearly endangers Sudan's democratic transition.
In 2017, the then government of Omar al-Bashir visited the gold mines of Hemedti's brother, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo, in north Darfur, and the ministry responsible even issued a press release. In the current court case against ex-president al-Bashir for corruption, his former office manager testified that Hemedti's brother is said to have received five million euros from the former dictator as a result. Further research by Global Witness shows that 186,000 USD worth of remittance receipts were leaked between the RSF and a recipient in China with reference to Al Junaid. It is more than likely that the money from the gold mines goes directly into the equipment and armament of the RSF, which is accused of heinous crimes against communities in the war-affected areas, internally displaced persons, migrants, refugees, women and protestors.
In fact, protests by miners working in the Al Junaid company’s gold mines in Kordofan were brutally crushed. The workers protested against the use of toxic substances that contribute to animal deaths and severe health and environmental damage. Suppressing protests is one of the specialties of the RSF. Their earnings from gold mining are invested, among other things, to buy countless Toyota and Landcruiser pickup trucks in Dubai. In the first half of 2019 alone, over 1,000 Toyotas were purchased by the RSF in Dubai. The pick-up trucks are then equipped with machine guns and were a conspicuous sight on the streets of Khartoum and other large cities, especially during the many protests and demonstrations during the revolution. This was also the case with the massacre in Khartoum on June 3, 2019, when RSF troops stormed the sit-in camp in front of the military headquarters, killing over 124 people, and which, according to a BBC report in an interview with an anonymous RSF officer, was ordered by Hemedti's brother Abdul Rahim Daglo.
The current transitional government is trying to dissolve the companies controlled by the old regime, the security services and its supporters, and also to reform the mining industry and the associated gold trade. But how is this supposed to work if part of the old regime is in the new government? The machinations of the RSF are not monitored by neither the Sudanese military (which owns much of the economy itself) nor the civilian part of the transitional government. The RSF appears to act completely independently. In December 2019, Hemedti declared that he would hand over control over Jebel Amir to the transitional government. Global Witness doubts this. It is difficult to imagine how this process is monitored , due to the lack of transparency in the gold trade and the complex and non-transparent supply chains. It would not be surprising if the RSF and Al Junaid continue to operate illegally, especially in the continued absence of a Transtional Legislative Assembly that can ask questions of the executive branch of the government.
It is clear that Sudan's natural resources should not belong to any private company, let alone war criminals. As another report by Global Witness shows, gold from Jebel Amir's mines also reaches Europe and Germany's direct neighbor in Switzerland, via detours. From there it would only be a stone's throw to the European Union. The tremendous economic power of the RSF represents one of the biggest risks for Sudan's transition. With the signing of the Transitional Constitution, the RSF has fatally become an official part of the Sudanese state’s coercive apparatus: a parallel force, legally, to the Sudan Armed Forces (the military). Accordingly, its income and expenditures must now also come under civilian control. The same applies to the country's natural resources, which must not remain in the hands of the RSF or the military. In fact, communities across the country have been organizing and agitating against the willful impoverishment of their communities and the destruction of nature and lives wrecked by the mining operations. Only by weakening Hemedti and the RSF’s economic power will his political power also decline. The #EndJanjaweed campaign seeks to ensure that there is no future for the RSF, in mining, or elsewhere.
See the complete Global Witness report here: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/beneath-shine-tale-two-gold-refiners/
This post was last updated on 16/10/2020
After the independence of South Sudan in 2011, when oil revenues dropped dramatically, other sources of income had to be found. Soon after, gold was found in the western parts of Sudan, in Darfur. That area that has long been terrorized by the RSF. Today, the country's largest gold company, Al Junaid, is owned by the brother and nephews of the RSF’s top commader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti). Hemedti’s brother, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo, is also RSF deputy commander. The "former militia" leader Hemedti is now not only in the Sovereign Council of the transitional government, but also on the supervisory board of Al Junaid.
The connection of RSF and Hemedti to the country's gold deposits is undeniable. In 2017, the RSF forcibly gained control of the Jebel Amir gold mines in north Darfur, which are some of the largest and most lucrative in the country. At that time, Hemedti's gold company Al Junaid already existed and operated smaller mines in the country. Since Al Junaid has gained controll of Jebel Amir, Hemedti has become one of the richest people in the country.
It is no secret that Hemedti and the RSF make a seemingly endless fortune with the gold. In order to polish up his and the RSF's image, Hemedti pledged more than one billion US dollars to the Central Bank of Sudan after the 2019 revolution and the economic crisis that followed. He himself states that this money comes from the salaries of RSF troops in Libya and Yemen and from the gold mines and other investments of the RSF.
The international non-governmental organization Global Witness reported in December 2019 that according to leaked documents, the company of Hemedti's brother, Al Junaid, owns a bank account in the United Arab Emirates on behalf of the RSF. This clearly proves the financial independence of the RSF. Besides Al Junaid, two small dummy companies also play a role in the business of the RSF: GSK, a small Sudanese technology company, and Tradive General Trading LLC, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. Leaked documents and the archived website of GSK as well as Global Witness' research at the Ministry of Economic Development in Dubai show Hemedti's other brother, Algoney Hamdan Daglo, as owner and CEO of GSK and Tradive.
What was supposed to be a generous and merciful gesture after the revolution to portray Hemedti and his family as successful and generous businessman is, however, exactly the problem: It shows quite clearly that the RSF with its gold mines keeps a parallel economy to the national one, exploiting resources that belong to those communities and the Sudanese people, the majority of whom live in abject poverty. From a strategic point of view, this parallel economy also clearly endangers Sudan's democratic transition.
In 2017, the then government of Omar al-Bashir visited the gold mines of Hemedti's brother, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo, in north Darfur, and the ministry responsible even issued a press release. In the current court case against ex-president al-Bashir for corruption, his former office manager testified that Hemedti's brother is said to have received five million euros from the former dictator as a result. Further research by Global Witness shows that 186,000 USD worth of remittance receipts were leaked between the RSF and a recipient in China with reference to Al Junaid. It is more than likely that the money from the gold mines goes directly into the equipment and armament of the RSF, which is accused of heinous crimes against communities in the war-affected areas, internally displaced persons, migrants, refugees, women and protestors.
In fact, protests by miners working in the Al Junaid company’s gold mines in Kordofan were brutally crushed. The workers protested against the use of toxic substances that contribute to animal deaths and severe health and environmental damage. Suppressing protests is one of the specialties of the RSF. Their earnings from gold mining are invested, among other things, to buy countless Toyota and Landcruiser pickup trucks in Dubai. In the first half of 2019 alone, over 1,000 Toyotas were purchased by the RSF in Dubai. The pick-up trucks are then equipped with machine guns and were a conspicuous sight on the streets of Khartoum and other large cities, especially during the many protests and demonstrations during the revolution. This was also the case with the massacre in Khartoum on June 3, 2019, when RSF troops stormed the sit-in camp in front of the military headquarters, killing over 124 people, and which, according to a BBC report in an interview with an anonymous RSF officer, was ordered by Hemedti's brother Abdul Rahim Daglo.
The current transitional government is trying to dissolve the companies controlled by the old regime, the security services and its supporters, and also to reform the mining industry and the associated gold trade. But how is this supposed to work if part of the old regime is in the new government? The machinations of the RSF are not monitored by neither the Sudanese military (which owns much of the economy itself) nor the civilian part of the transitional government. The RSF appears to act completely independently. In December 2019, Hemedti declared that he would hand over control over Jebel Amir to the transitional government. Global Witness doubts this. It is difficult to imagine how this process is monitored , due to the lack of transparency in the gold trade and the complex and non-transparent supply chains. It would not be surprising if the RSF and Al Junaid continue to operate illegally, especially in the continued absence of a Transtional Legislative Assembly that can ask questions of the executive branch of the government.
It is clear that Sudan's natural resources should not belong to any private company, let alone war criminals. As another report by Global Witness shows, gold from Jebel Amir's mines also reaches Europe and Germany's direct neighbor in Switzerland, via detours. From there it would only be a stone's throw to the European Union. The tremendous economic power of the RSF represents one of the biggest risks for Sudan's transition. With the signing of the Transitional Constitution, the RSF has fatally become an official part of the Sudanese state’s coercive apparatus: a parallel force, legally, to the Sudan Armed Forces (the military). Accordingly, its income and expenditures must now also come under civilian control. The same applies to the country's natural resources, which must not remain in the hands of the RSF or the military. In fact, communities across the country have been organizing and agitating against the willful impoverishment of their communities and the destruction of nature and lives wrecked by the mining operations. Only by weakening Hemedti and the RSF’s economic power will his political power also decline. The #EndJanjaweed campaign seeks to ensure that there is no future for the RSF, in mining, or elsewhere.
See the complete Global Witness report here: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/beneath-shine-tale-two-gold-refiners/
This post was last updated on 16/10/2020